Tuesday, April 2, 2019

Relationship Between Australia and Southeast Asia

Relationship Between Australia and southeast fightd Asia conceptionThe purpose of this write up is to analyse the race amid Australia and selenium Asia ( sea) in the three decades following the end of the Vietnam War. In order to do this, the paper compares and contrasts frugal, political and security policies of Labour giving medications in 1980s and the early mid-nineties and Liberal government in the new-fashioned mid-nineties and the twenty-first century.Australia and Southeast Asia in 1980sThe pre-1980s period had witnessed Australias loyalty to its powerful friends and the chilly War doctrine of containment (Jones 2003). Australia engaged in forward defence to impede the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. However, this trend had changed in the 1980s, in the main due to changing geopolitical environment and economic probability (Goldsworthy ?, Vaughn 2004). Australia pick out the Manichean nonion of difference with the region, rather than protection from it. This move desire to define Australia as a mature nation with an identity ideologically tailored to what Whitlam, its chief architect, conceived to be the requirements of an independent, regionally-engaged Australia (Jones 200338).Australias regionalist approach was a repartee to the decline of the American and British interest in sea, including military presence. Moreover, in a new world of emerging regional associations, Australia was looking for a region to call its own. Thus, the Australian governments of the 1980s, both Coalition and Labor, directed their dainty towards the goal of an interdependent, open and inclusive sea compatible with Australian economic and strategic interests. It was the Labour Hawkes government, and its two foreign ministers Hayden and Evans, that significantly spread out the scope of the elaborateness (Goldsworthy?).It has been argued that the most important force driving the engagement with ocean was economic opportunity (Goldsworthy?, Jones 200 3). The rise of Asian economies, accompanied by a decline in Australian economy in the mid-seventies and 1980s, encouraged the perception of trade and investment. The Labour government undertook a program of economic reforms designed to encourage a more competitive and export-oriented craft profile, attempting to achieve greater economic integration through the creation of regional multilateral institutions (Goldsworthy ?). This resulted in an increase of Australian exports to its ASEAN neighbours by 24% amongst 1977 and 1988 (Jones 2003).The Labor government led by Bob Hawke cultivated a distinctive regional and multilateral focus in security in 1983 (Jones 2003). The ASEAN Regional Forum had been established to foster dialogue on regional security issues and an engagement on maintaining security between Australia and Indonesia had been formed (Goldsworthy ?).By the end of 1980s, the importance of Australias engagement with SEA had become a central strand of thinking on Austra lias place in the world.Australia and Southeast Asia in 1990sThe early 1990s, which saw the end of the frosty War, witnessed an accelerated transition in perceptions of SEA from battlefield to market. The engagement with SEA had become the organising principle for a range of policies, including diplomatic efforts to alter and deepen symmetric relations with SEA countries, attempts to create regional structures for co-operation on economic and strategic matters, and efforts to boost knowledge of Asia and skills for engagement among the Australian universe of discourse (Goldsworthy?8). Paul Keating pressed for Australia to be a country which is deeply co-ordinated into the region around us (Vaughn 2004). external Minister Evans assureed bilateral ties and created strong regional linkages. The government also managed to form the security agreement with Soharto.Australias approach to SEA has changed significantly in the late 1990s, with the arriver of John Howard (Goldsworthy?, Vaughn 2004). Vaughn (2004) lists six major reasons as to why the Labour government engagements failed. First, it was an attempt to fundamentally reshape the national identity that lacked widespread Australian public support. Second, it also lacked support from a broad cross department of political elites. Third, it required the acquiescence of Asia, which was not forthcoming. Fourth, the Asian monetary crisis of 1998 taught Australia that it could watch without over- confidence on Asia and that the economic rewards of engagement with Asia were not assured. Fifth, differences in values continue to be difficult to reconcile. Finally, the Keating/Evans policy of engagement was turning away from reliance on great and powerful friends. harmonize to Jones (200341), Howard has both reinvented and adapted a realist posture which stresses the national interest and the state as the key proletarian in supranational society. Howards government returned to the more canvas and skeptical a pproach to foreign relations of the Menzies era.Australia and Southeast Asia in the 21st CenturyAccording to Vaughn (2004), several developments under prime quantity Minister Howards leaders marked Australias shift away from Asian and SEA engagement toward juxtaposed relations with the US. Australias Foreign and Trade insurance policy White Paper identifies American alliance as the first of the key regional and bilateral relationships. According to Richardson (2005), the close ties to the Bush administration have helped to foster the perception, especially in Muslim majority Indonesia and Malaysia, that Australia is a proxy for the US in the region. Jones (2003) only adds that Howard has been described as a narrowly concentrate domestic politician, apathetic in and uncomfortable with Australias neighbours. According to Richardson (2005), ASEAN is not Australias admittance to Asia anymore. This is evident in recent growing trade and investment links with China and India.Howar ds government has not turned his back to SEA completely (Jones 2003). The government accepts that Asian political integrity remains life-and-death to Australia. Australia has been a major contributor to SEA fiscal stability, has played a central role in stabilising East Timor, and has effectively worked with regional government on solicitudeism issues.Despite the Howard governments desire to focus Australias outside(a) relations more firmly on the United States, the war against terror has required Australia to also focus on Southeast Asia. According to Vaughn (2004), the war against terror has offered Australia and Southeast Asia the opportunity to develop new constructive and reciprocally beneficial security linkages. Considering the presence of a number of terrorist groups and supporters, including Jemaah Islamiyah, KMM, Laskar Jihad, MILF, and Abu Sayyaf Group, Southeast Asia is a region from which threats to Australia originate. The government attaches a high priority to stre ngthening CT cooperation with SEA partners (DFAT 2004). Cooperation is being pursued bilaterally as well as through regional bodies. Australia has concluded counter-terror memoranda of understanding with Fiji, Malaysia, Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, PNG, East Timor as well as Indonesia. Australia has supported ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Council for security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, the SEA regional centre for CT in Kuala Lumpur, the International justice enforcement academy in Bangkok, the Asia-Pacific Group on Money-Laundering and the Philippine centre on transnational crime in Manila. The government has provided support through the Australian Federal Police, immigration authorities, transport authorities, emergency management authorities and financial intelligence units (DFAT 2004).The government has been attempting to address other regional vulnerabilities. Some SEA states have been characterized by slow growth rates, insufficient employment opportunities, economic h ardship, and political and leadership weaknesses (Defence 2003). This has led to people smuggling, illegal fishing, money-laundering and corruption. According to Goldsworthy (?), SEA economies collapsed in 1997 and then failed to recover. Today, Southeast Asia is heavily targeted by organised illegal groups, who can work to undermine (Australias) security by laundering money, violating borders, and importing illicit substances for profit (Keelty 20056-7). Ling (2001) claims that due to its pluralistic societies, many SEA countries have internal racial riots and ethnic encroachs, associated with the rise of modern nationhood.The 2006 Australian promote White Paper is focusing, among other things, on accelerating growth, fostering cognitive operation states, investing in people, promoting regional stability and cooperation ( depressant 2006). Foreign Minister Downer stated that the government will increase assistance to the regional governments to strengthen governance, tackle co rruption and better harness their own resources for development (Downer 2006).Australia is transaction with vulnerabilities through a number of bilateral bodies. AusAID maintained its focus on poverty reduction in the region and adapted to playing a key role in more coherent, and significantly larger, whole-of-government responses to international challengesincluding significantly rising the profile of support for basic education in Indonesia supporting(a) cooperative responses to shared problems in our region such as regional transport and police trainingResponding to humanitarian emergenciesAssisting reconstruction effortsContributing to the international response to global challenges such as HIV/AIDS and nourishment security(Davis 20043).While it has shifted focus towards the United States, Australia has continue trade initiatives in SEA (Vaughn 2004). According to the DFAT (2006), the total two-way trade with SEA change magnitude 25 per cent in 2005-06. Between 2000-01 and 200 5-06, total trade increase at an average rate of 8 per cent per annum. Australia signed a free trade agreement with Singapore, initiated negotiations towards an agreement with Thailand, and pursued investment opportunities in Vietnam (Vaughn 2004).There is now evidence of improved political relationship between Australia and some SEA countries (Richardson 2005). Dr Mahathirs successor as Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi made it a priority to repair relations with Australia and the US. At the same(p) time, Australia Indonesia relations have greatly improved as East Timor has attenuate as a bilateral issue. Governance in Australia, Malaysia and Singapore is establish on parliamentary democracy inherited from British colonial rule. The Philippines has a US-style system of representative government. Thailand and Indonesia have moved from authoritarian government. However, many political, ethnical and other differences remain. Democracy in Southeast Asia is often messy and on that point is authoritarian rule in Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.ConclusionThe 1980s saw Australias engagement with SEA becoming a central focus of Australias foreign affairs, focusing on engagement with the region, rather than protection from it. The economic reforms, encouraged by the Labour governments, resulted in an increase of Australian exports to its ASEAN neighbours.The 1990s witnessed two different approaches to SEA. The Labour government of the early 1990s had focused on an accelerated transition in perceptions of SEA from battlefield to marketplace, determined to see Australia deeply integrated into the region. This changed significantly in the late 1990s, with the arrival of John Howard, who reinvented and adapted a realist posture, shifting away from Asian and SEA engagement toward closer relations with the US.Although the Howards government has continue to pursue close relationship with the US in the 21st century, it has not turned its back to SEA comple tely. The war against terror has offered Australia and Southeast Asia the opportunity to develop new linkages. The government has been attempting to address other regional vulnerabilities and has continued trade initiatives in SEA. Furthermore, there has been evidence of improved political relationship between Australia and some SEA countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia.BibliographyDavis, B. AusAID Annual Report 2003-2004.Defence (2003). A Defence Update 2003. discussion section of DefenceDFAT (2006). Composition of Trade Australia 2005-2006. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.DFAT (2004). Transnational Terrorism The Threat to Australia. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.DFAT (2003). Advancing the National Interests -Australias Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.Downer, A. (2006). Launch of the Aid Paper, Speech to the National Press Club, 26 April 2006.Goldsworthy, D. (?). Facing northeast Introduction. www.mup.unimelb.e du.au/pdf/0-522-85024-3.pdfJones, D.M. (2003). Regional Illusion and its Aftermath. Policy, Vol.19, No.3.Keelty, M. (May 2005). Enhancing security department through integrity Enforcement. protection in Government 2005 Conference, Canberra.Ling, O.G. Governance in Plural Societies and Security Management of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia in Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (eds) Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Singapore Select Publishing, 2001, pp.288-317.Paul, E. (1999). Australia and Southeast Asia Regionalisation, democracy and conflict. Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol.29, Iss.3, pp.285-309.Richardson, M. (2005). Australia-Southeast Asia Relations and the East Asian Summit. Australian Journal of International Affairs. Vol.59, No.3, pp.351-365.Vaughn, B.R. (2004). Australias Strategic Identity Post-September 11 in Context Implications for the War Against Terror in Southeast Asia. Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.26, Iss.1, pp.94-116.

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